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-82LAND REFORM IN KENYA - SOME PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
by
Simon Coldham
Introduction
Some 90% of the population of Kenya lives in the rural areas and
depends on agriculture, in most cases small-holder agriculture, for its
livelihood. Patterns of land use and land distribution vary enormously
throughout the country and, in particular, the effects of the segregationist land policies of the colonial administration continue to be significant today, twenty years after the legal barriers between the African
Reserves and the Scheduled Areas (reserved exclusively for Europeans)
were dismantled. In the former Scheduled Areas the main thrust of the
government's policy has been to secure the transfer of farms in African
ownership. In the early years after Independence many of such farms
were bought by the government and subdivided for various types of settlement, though in more recent years it has become increasingly common
for Africans to purchase European farms, either as individuals or forming companies or partnerships for the purpose. However, while the
land transfer programme in general and the establishment of settlement
schemes in particular represent a significant component of Kenyan land
policy, they remain outside the scope of this paper. 1 I am solely concerned here with the former African Reserves and with the attempts that
have been made to use tenurial reforms to promote agricultural development in these areas. The expression "land reform" in the title of this
paper refers to the land adjudication programme, i.e., the process in the
course of which customary land rights are adjudicated, land holdings consolidated (where appropriate) and registers of title drawn up.
The programme was first implemented in the Kikuyu Land Unit in
the mid fifties. 2 At this time the Kikuyu Land Unit was seriously overcrowded and was suffering increasingly both from soil erosion and from
the fragmentation of holdings. While agricultural officers did take measures to secure good land use and to encourage the voluntary consolidation
of holdings, it was only in the conditions of the Emergency that a more
radical land policy evolved. With a view to weaning the Kikuyu away from
their allegi nce to the Mau Mau guerillas based in the forests bordering
the Land Unit, the Colonial government took two related courses of action.
It confiscated the land of activists and those suspected of aiding the activists, with the intention of distributing it to the loyalists and, secondly, it
embarked upon a compulsory villagisation policy, as security was difficult
to maintain while the Kikuyu continued to live in scattered settlements. It
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was realised at the same time that this would be an appropriate moment to
press ahead with large-scale, compulsory land consolidation schemes,
especially since this would provide an opportunity of rewarding loyalists
with larger and better holdings.
At first little attention was given to the exact nature of the title which
the "owner" of a consolidated holding would acquire. Influential Kikuyu had
for a long time been demanding individual titles and while certain colonial
officers concerned about the social implications of acceding to their demands, agricultural experts saw customary land law as an obstacle to development, particularly since the traditional rules relating to the allocation
and inheritance of land were largely responsible for fragmentation of holdings that had occurred. Thus the Swynnerton Plan proposed that
the African farmer... be provided with such security of
tenure through an indefeasible title as will encourage him
to invest his labour and profits into the development of
his farm and as wil enable him to offer it as security for
financial credits.
The East Africa Royal Commission endorsed this proposal, recommending
specifically the adjudication and registration of individual titles in suitable
areas, and in 1959 the Native Lands Registration Ordinance was passed
which provided processes for the consolidation of land; 4 and for registration of title to apply to consolidated land, and for adjudication of disputes.
5
This system, embodied today in the Registered Land Act 1963, is
based on the English land registration system. It is, however, important
to note that the Ordinance introduced a complete code for land registered
under its provisions. Only intestate succession to registered land continues to be governed by customary law. No attempt was made to reproduce customary forms of landholdings by providing for some kind of group
title or family representative title, 0 nor was consideration given to the
possibility of establishing producer cooperatives or state farms. The
individual smallholder was seen as the key to rural development. Accordingly, registration of a person as proprietor of a piece of land operated to
vest in him absolute ownership of that land, free from all other interests
and claims, but subject only to registered interests and such other overriding interests in the land.7
Since Independence the government of Kenya has implemented the land
adjudication programme with great vigour since it sees it "as a major precondition for increasing land productivity by preventing uneconomic fragmentation, by encouraging long-term investments in the land, and by creating the collateral for farm credit." 8 By mid 1977, 4.8 million hectares of
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trust land had been adjudicated and the government plans to raise the total
to 8.4 million hectares by 1983.9 The programme covers virtually all the
agricultural areas of Kenya and since 1968 it has been extended to the pastoral areas, particularly to Masailand. As it was neither practical nor
desirable to register individual titles throughout the pastoral areas, this
extension required legislation enabling the registration of some form of
group title. The Land (Group Representatives) Act 1968, which vests title
to land in group representatives, was therefore passed to provide a legal
foundation for the establishment of group ranches in these areas. 10
As has been seen, the arguments advanced in favour of the programme
are many and varied. At the very least it is designed to put an end to
boundary disputes, to make titles secure and to introduce a safe, simple
and cheap system of conveyancing. It is also hoped that it will encourage
farmers to invest labour and profits in their holdings, that it will enable
them to offer registered titles as security for credit and that, by creating
a land market, it will put an end to the uneconomic parcellation and fragmentation of landholdings. However, while the programme is commonly
presented as merely providing a legal framework within which greater agricultural productivity may be achieved, its political and social implications
cannot be ignored. After all, it was designed at the outset as a way of rewarding those loyal to the government (often the wealthier farmers) at the
expense of its opponents (often the land-hungry). Moreover, Swynnerton
predicted that as a consequence of land registration ". . . energetic or rich
Africans will be able to acquire more land and bad or poor farmers less,
creating a landed and a landless class," a process which he welcomed as
"a normal step in the evolution of a country. ",11 The extent to which the
programme can be said to have resulted in increased socio-economic
stratification in the rural areas will receive comment.
However, this paper is primarily designed to give an overview of the
land reform programme: to describe the legal structuring of the programme, to assess the extent to which it has achieved its objectives and, in
particular, to consider the lessons that a study of the programme can teach
us about the use of law as an instrument of social change. Although lipservice is occasionally paid to the importance of preserving communal
values and the other virtues of the traditional African way of life, 12 official
rhetoric in Kenya sees customary law as an obstacle to development and to
the creation of a strong united nation. The decentralised, variable and inarticulate nature of customary law makes it an inappropriate instrument for
implementing modernising policies. The government of Kenya has therefore sought, in a number of instances, to replace customary law by a unified system of law based largely on English legal concepts, thereby indicating its belief in the effectiveness of legislation as a mode of achieving its
objectives. 13 However, it is now a cliche of law and social change studies
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that there is often a serious discrepancy between the law in books and the
law in action; indeed we may perhaps find it more surprising that the mere
enactment of statute has any effect at all, particularly where, as in the
case of the Kenya land reform programme, considerable changes of behaviour are required on the part of those at whom it is directed.
The land adjudication process.
A distinctive feature of the land reform programme is its use of
elected, unpaid local committees at all stages of the adjudication process
and particularly in the settlement of disputes. An executive officer is
usually appointed by the land adjudication department to act as a kind of
general secretary to the committee, advising members on points of law and
procedure and enjoying responsibility for the preparation of the adjudication record. As the land register is based on the adjudication record, the
success of the adjudication process largely depends on the thoroughness
and honesty with which the committee sets about its task. While the Land
Adjudication Act establishes a rather complex appeals' system, it does not
provide for an appeal to the courts; at the apex of the system is the Minister of Lands and Settlement, and his order is final. 1 4 Once all the
appeals procedures have been exhausted, the land register is drawn up and
it should, of course, act as a mirror providing an accurate and complete
reflection of all interests that subsist in relation to a given place of land.
Registration of title is not intended to effect any change in substantive
rights; indeed, "(l)t is. . . a cardinal principle of adjudication that it recognises and confirms rights which actually exist. "15 Nevertheless, it is
clear that the land adjudication process operates to confer on some people
more extensive rights than they fromerly enjoyed while depriving others of
their customary rights. There are two reasons for this. One is inherent
in the technical alien nature of the system which is being introduced and the
other arises from the manifold opportunities offered to individuals to manipulate the adjudication process to their own advantage.
It is clear that a heavy burden of responsibility rests on the officer
charged with preparing the adjudication record. If he is satisfied that any
person has, under recognised customary law, exercised rights in or over
land which should be recognised as ownership, he is required to determine
that person to be owner of that land. 6 In addition he must record the
names of those entitled to any interest not amounting to ownership, including any lease, right of occupation, charge or other epFumbrance, whether
These provisions
by virtue of recognised customary law or otherwise.
rest on two questionable assumptions. They assume that it is possible to
equate rights over land recognised by customary law with rights recognised
by the Registered Land Act 1963 and they assume that those persons
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responsible for preparing the adjudication record have the time and
expertise necessary to secure the protection of customary rights. If these
assumptions are not well founded, as will be argued here, then land adjudication will have the effect of rearranging land rights and increasing the
probability of disputes arising at a later date.
The use of technical legal terminology specific to one legal system to
describe the incidents of another1 ery different legal system, must ineviCertainly writings in English about
tably create a distorted picture.
customary land tenure abound in spurious correlations of this kind. The
truth is that institutions like the Leviritic Union, the Jadak(Luo) or Muhoi
(Kikuyu), the "redeemable sale" (Kikuyu) an-d'5 on, do-not fit very comfortably within the structure of English land law; there are no exact equivalents to be found. An even more serious problem arises from the difficulty of defining adequately the interests of individual family members in
land occupied and farmed by the family, for it is clear that on the registration of, say, the household-head as absolute owner, the rights of his
mother, wives and children, etc., will be extinguished, if no way is
devised to protect them. In practice, the adjudication authorities are only
concerned with identifying the "owner" of a piece of land and make no
attempt to record lesser interests. This is hardly surprising as neither
the committee nor the recording officer have the expertise or time required to carry out such a task. They are generally men of limited education, totally ill -equipped to handle sophisticated English legal concepts
(e.g., trusts, contractual licences, overriding interests), and they are
pressed to complete the adjudication process as swiftly as possible. The
result, however, is that the process deprives some people of their customary rights while conferring new rights on others. As it is seldom clear at
the time that this is what is happening and as those concerned lack legal
advice and have, themselves, only the vaguest understanding of the implications of land registration, it is usually some time before the inevitable
disputes break out.
The facts of Esiroyo v. Esiroyo and another 1 9 are fairly typical of the
sort of dispute that arises. Here the plaintiff was the registered proprietor of a twenty-two acre plot of land on which he lived with his family. A
few years previously he had allocated some ten acres of the plot to two of
his sons (the defendants), but after a number of quarrels, one of which had
culminated in the plaintiff entering on the land occupied by the defendants
and damaging their crops, he brought an action in trespass against them
and applied for a perpetual injunction to restrain them from continuing or
repeating their acts of trespass. The court gave judgment for the plaintiff
on the grounds that, although the defendants did have rights of occupation
under customary law, such rights were not overriding interests and they
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were extingu shed on the registration of the plaintiff as the owner of the
whole plot.
While it is submitted that the case was rightly decided, it is
difficult not to sympathise with the fate of the Esiroyo sons. However, the
courts have found ways of remedying the injustices sometimes caused by
land registration, where an applicant claims that he should have been
registered as the proprietor of a piece of land. While the courts are not
permitted to order rectification of the land register in the case of first
registration, they have clearly resented this limitation on their powers and
have frequently avoided its harsher implications by a flexible and robust
use of the trust concept. Thus where a court finds that an applicant was,
according to customary law, the "owner" of a piece of land but that for one
reason or another (e.g., the applicant's youth or absence at the time of
land adjudication) the defendant (often a close relative of the applicant) was
registered as the owner, it will not hesitate to declare that the defendant
holds the land off rust for the applicant and to order the defendant to convey
the land to him.
Indeed, the Esiroyo sons might, paradoxically, have
been successful if they had claimed that their father held the ten acre plot
on trust for them. While the efforts of the courts to do justice in such
cases may be welcome, it should be noted that they are in effect adjudicating land titles and providing an alternative system of appeal from the decisions of the land adjudication authorities. Yet this is exactly what the provision prohibiting the rectification of first registration was designed to
avoid.
It has been suggested in the three preceding paragraphs that it is to a
large extent inherent in the land adjudication process that there will be
"winners" and "losers," but there is also some evidence that certain individuals may manipulate the process to their own advantage. During the
colonial period there were, of course, a number of farmers, often distinguished from their neighbours by their possession of money and know-how,
who were accumulating land, fencing it and developing it, and it was just
such farmers who appreciated the advantages of land consolidation and who
took every opportunity to extend their holdings in shrewd anticipation of the
day when individual titles would be granted. In other words the prospect of
land adjudication may encourage land accumulation on the part of those who
understand its implications. 23- Moreover, throughout the adjudication
process the odds are heavily weighted against the poor, the uneducated and
those unfamiliar with bureaucratic ways. It is not simply that it may be
necessary to bribe members of the adjudication committee, but that at all
stages of the process calls are being made on skills and funds that most
people lack. A lot depends on knowing one's rights and being able to
prosecute them effectively. A system which requires the concise and articulate presentation of a case, where summonses have to be answered, where
appeals have to be made in writing and within strict time limits, where fees
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are payable at every stage of the process, clearly favours certain individuals at the expense of others.
24
Land adjudication does put an
The effectiveness of the register.
end to boundary disputes and it is arguable that disputes about first regis tration will die out as people resign themselves to the new state of affairs.
From this viewpoint the problems caused by faulty land adjudication are
only temporary, whereas the benefits of land registration are permanent
and indisputable. The former uncertainties of customary law have dis appeared, to be replaced by a system where title is secure, where trans actions are safe and where rights in land are relatively easy to define both
by reference to the Registered Land Act 1963 itself and to the large body of
case-law to be derived from other jurisdictions, particularly from England.
These are three direct consequences of any system of registration of title,
and important consequences they are. The title of the registered proprietor is, generally speaking, unimpeachable and no person dealing with him
is concerned to go behind the register; customary procedures for trans ferring interests in land have been superseded and customary restraints on
alienation have no legal effect.
However, the realisation of these advantages depends on the registration system operating effectively, i. e., on the readiness and ability of
those involved, both farmers and civil servants, to cooperate with the
system. If, for example, registered proprietors continue to deal with their
land according to customary law instead of following the procedures laid
down in the Registered Land Act 1963, then clearly the system is not operating effectively. Of course, unregistered dealings will generally be devoid
of legal effect, but as long as those involved behave as though they had such
validity, customary law will continue to operate de facto. When such dealings are eventually challenged by someone prep aTd to assert his strict
legal rights under the Act, the courts will be faced by the same complex
situations that characterised land disputes in the colonial period for which
land registration was designed to eliminate. It is interesting, therefore, to
consider the extent to which the land registers do reflect the state of affairs
on the ground.
Not surprisingly, customary law continues to determine the way in
which a household-head divides his land among his family, so that a single
piece of registered land will be sub-divided on the ground between the
registered proprietor and the members of his family. As such subdivisions
are rarely registered, these members will be mere licensees liable to be
evicted at any time by the registered proprietor. In spite of such subdivisions the land register remains an accurate record of title upon which a
prospective purchaser may rely. Unregistered sales and successions do
pose a serious threat to the registration system and there is evidence that
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they are occurring on a large scale. Thus in one area studied by the
present writer at least 30% of all land sales and at least 96.5% of successions took place off the register. As this was a relatively "advanced" part
of Kenya, there is no reason to believe that the system is working much
more effectively elsewhere. 25 Such figures should give the authorities
considerable cause for concern, since they suggest either that people are
not aware of the need to register their dealings or that they do not see the
advantage of doing so. Admittedly, in a country where the legal profession is small and concentrated in the big cities and where there is no tradition of employing experts to handle conveyancing, it is not surprising that
unregistered dealings occur. Of course, there are Kenyans who appreciate
the need to register dealings and the relatively high proportion of sales
registered may be attributed to th 6 fact that the purchasers were generally
Moreover, it is not clear why people
men of education and experience.
should perceive cooperation with the system as being to their advantage,
particularly where, as in the case of successions to land, they are dealing
with relatives or friends. There is simply no incentive to spend time and
money observing the complex procedures laid down in the Registered Land
Act 1963 for the ascertainment of heirs and the registration of successions.
Efforts have been made to educate the public about the significance of
land registration; posters are prominently featured on the walls of land
registries warning of the dangers of not registering land dealings, and
chiefs frequently repeat the same warnings at their meetings. The effect
of such exhortations is unclear. An alternative approach would be to make
use of certain statutory provisions. Thus, parties to an unregistered
dealing are almost certainly committing an offence under the Land Control
Act 1967.27 Moreover, the land Registrar is empowered to summon people
".. to appear and give any information or explanation respecting land..
and also to compel registration of instruments registrable under the Regis tered Land Act 1963.29 The government seems to favour greater use of
these powers, 3 0 but, political and moral scruples apart, this would hardly
be an effective way of dealing with the problem as it would depend on the
land control board or the land Registrar becoming aware of the unregistered dealing in the first place. It is the opinion of the present writer that
unregistered dealings (especially sudcessions) will continue to occur on a
large scale with the result that the land register will increasingly fail to
reflect the true state of affairs on the ground. As disputes become more
frequent, the courts will, in effect, be faced with the task of readjudicating
land titles. If this is the case, theIojhe wisdom of the whole registration
programme is called into question.
*,,28
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Some economic consequences.
The problems discussed in the last two sections have perhaps been
insufficiently appreciated by the government, partly because they are
regarded as temporary, as the "growing pains" of the system which will
disappear as the adjudication machinery becomes more efficient and landowners more sophisticated, and partly because the justification of the land
reform programme has almost invariably been argued in economic terms.
The economic benefits which the programme is claimed to bring about
seem to fall into two categories. In the first place, it is argued that as
landowners now enjoy security of tenure, they have an incentive to invest
in their farms. Money that may previously have been spent on litigation
over boundaries can now be productively employed in introducing new
crops, purchasing new equipment and generally developing their land.
Farmers are more likely to make use of the agricultural extension services and, most important of all, they will be able to raise loans on the
security of their registered titles. 32 The claim that registration of title
leads to increased investment in the land has been made on numerous
occasions and seems, indeed, to be the most important single consideration in the minds of the programme's advocates. It is a claim which is
obviously difficult to prove. There can be no necessary connection between registration of title and economic development. Moreover, it is
difficult to attribute any development that has occurred to a single factor,
particularly since the last twenty years have seen an enormous expansion
in many fields of government activity, in communications, in education,
in the provision of extension services and so forth. The second kind of
economic benefit that is credited to the land reform programme relates
to the pattern of landholding. It is argued that the fragmentation and the
parcellation of landholdings have an adverse effect on agricultural productivity and it is hoped that, as a result of the introduction of the registration system, a land market will emerge which will enable farmers to sell
off uneconomic pieces of land to those able to farm them more effectively.
That the existence of a land market might result in certain farmers accumulating land at the expense of making others landless has rarely been a
cause for concern in Kenya.
While no discussion of the land reform programme would be complete
without some examination of its economic implications, the issues involved are highly complex and it is obviously impossible here to treat
them in the detail that they deserve. However, although the discussion
will necessarily be superficial and many of the conclusions tentative, it
will be argued that the justification of the land reform programme in
terms of its economic consequences is difficult to sustain.
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(i) Credit. There are a large number of organisations operating
within Kenya today which provide credit to farmers, and they differ both in
the criteria they employ, in the kinds of security they require and in the
control they exercise over the use of their loans. While, therefore, it is
difficult to make any generalisations about the provision of credit and its
role in smallholder agriculture, such studies that exist indicate that there
is no reason to attribute much of the agricultural, development that has
occurred in Kenya's smallholder areas over the last fifteen years to the
farmer's newly-acquired power to raise loans by charging his land. In the
first place, a mere glance at the land registers shows how rare it is for
farmers to charge their lands; thus in two separate areas studied by the
present writer (both relatively "advanced" areas) only about 9% of landowners had raised money by charging their lands and this was over a
period of 11/15 years. It is not that farmers are ignorant of the possibility
of raising loans on the security of their land but that the supply of credit
falls a long way short of the demand for it. 3A
It is pertinent, therefore, to ask which farmers do have access to
credit, and here the evidence is unanimous that lending institutions tend to
favour the better farmers, particularly those (e. g., traders or government
servants) who enjoy off-farm incomes. Thus applications for Agricultural
Finance Corporation Loans are channelled through the local Agricultural
Officer after the applicant has received a visit from one of the extension
staff and a farm plan drawn up. Shortage of staff, however, makes it
impossible for even the most conscientious Agricultural Assistant to visit
all the farms in his area in the course of a year and in practice they tend to
concentrate on the better farmers, partly perhaps because these farmers
are the men who could influence their career prospects, but mainly because it is widely believed in the extension services that, as resources are
limited, they should be distributed where the rewards are likely to be the
greatest, i. e., among the better farmers. 3 4 This strategy of "betting on
the strong" combined with the A.F.C. 's increased emphasis on the creditworthiness of an applicant for a loan, results in the differential provision of
agricultural credit and ultimately, of course, in the heightening of rural inequality. In the more highly developed areas, where banks may be a more
important source of credit than government agencies, the picture is similar;
while the banks almost invariably require the borrower to charge his land
in their favour and to deposit his land certificate with them, they (understandably) favour farmers with off-farm incomes. 5
Although it is generally agreed that it is largely the better farmers,
particularly those with independent sources of income, who have been able
to raise loans on the security of their registered titles, it is not clear that
this has always secured agricultural development. The majority of bank
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loans, for example, do not appear to be used for agricultural purposes at
all. Moreover, even where the loans are used for agricultural purposes,
as are A.F.C. loans, it might be argued that agricultural productivity
would be more effectively promoted by channelling them to the poorer
rather than the richer farmers and that a government subsidised loans
system should take more account of a farmer's need for credit than of his
credit -worthiness.
The importance attached by lending institutions to an applicant's
credit-worthiness is explained by the fact that a registered title does not
in practice constitute good security. There is evidence that the banks, in
particular, are extremely reluctant to realise their security, preferring
to write off a debt rather than incur the odium to which the exercise of
their statutory power of sale would expose them. It has been suggested
that their main motive in taking a charge on a borrower's land is to induce
the farmer to take seriously the commitments he has entered into. 36 Moreover, other forms of security do exist and may prove more effective; in
particular, the irrevocable letter of instruction to a marketing cooperative
may prove an appropriate alternative to the charge of land.
Finally, it should
government, that it is
tural development has
rience of smallholder

be noted that the common belief, shared by the
primarily lack of credit that has retarded agriculbeen questioned by a writer with considerable expeagriculture in Kenya. She concludes:

There is evidence from many parts of Kenya of the
successful and widespread adoption of new practices,
some of which involve substantial investment expenditures, without the provision of credit, and there is evidence of plentiful supplies of rural savings. It is
certainly possible that the important requirements are
the technical information, the extension advice, the
farmer education, the availability of inputs, and other
elements making for high returns to investment.... It
may well be that alternative measures to aid smallholders would represent more effective uses of scarce
developp ent resources than programmes of subsidised
credit.
However, even assuming that the availability of credit is an important precondition of agricultural development, it seems hard to justify the land
registration programme in terms of the amount of credit for agricultural
investment that has been given to farmers on the security of their registered titles. 3 8 Development which has occurred in recent years may in
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part be attributable to that security of title which is conferred by registration and which may provide an incentive to invest in the land. 39 But the
role of credit does not seem very significant.
(ii) Pattern of landholding. It had been hoped that the security of title
conferred by land registration would create a land market enabling
farmers owning unworkable plots or fragments to sell them to others who
would be in a position to develop them more efficiently. The pattern of
landholding would naturally be affected; holdings would become larger and
consequently, it was argued, more productive. The promotion of agricultural development seemed to be the main concern and little thought was
given to the fate of those who would become landless in the process.
It had been seen that the land registration programme had its roots in
the various schemes set up in the nineteen-fifties to consolidate holdings in
the Kikuyu Land Unit, and there can be no doubt that the sort of fragmentation that existed then, when a single family might have literally dozens of
tiny plots, had an adverse effect on agricultural productivity. No other
areas suffered as badly from fragmentation as the Kikuyu Land Unit and
over the last fifteen years it has been the policy of the government to encourage the voluntary consolidation of holdings where appropriate. 40 The
land consolidation programme has been generally successful and, as far as
one can judge from the scanty evidence that exists, there is little likelihood that a process of refragmentation will occur on an alarming sale. It
is true that the sale of a plot of land is likely to result in increased fragmentation of ownership, but it is less likely to result in increased fragmentation of use (e. g., because the purchaser is buying the land for his son).
Moreover, even where fragmentation of use does occur, agricultural productivity may not be adversely affected, if only because it is the better
farmers, often farmers who can afford to hire labour, that tend to
purchase land. 41
The parcellation of holdings presents a more serious problem. Even
at the time of land registration there were in many areas a large number
of plots that were too small to be economically viable and the situation has
since deteriorated owing to the continued operation of the customary law
relating to the allocation and inheritance of land. 42 Farm profits decline
as the number of people dependent on the land increases, and credit becomes harder to raise as plots become smaller and more congested. A
number of ways of breaking this vicious circle have been proposed, though
none of them has proved very successful. One device has been to determine the minimum acreage required to make a holding in a given area economically viable and to prohibit the registration of holdings which are
smaller than this minimum. Thus the Land Control Act 1967 provides that
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a land control board ought generally to refuse its consent to the division of
land into two or more parcels where the division would be likely to reduce
the productivity of the land. 43 The local agricultural officer, often himself a member of the board, will generally determine the minimum acreage
for a particular locality. This system has not proved very effective for a
variety of reasons. Firstly, it is useless to set minimum acreages without taking into account the number of people who live on the land and depend on it for their livelihood. Secondly, the minimum acreages set by
the agricultural officer often exceed the average size of holdings at the
completion of land registration. Thirdly, the land control boards in practice tend to ignore such considerations. Finally, it is extremely rare for
subdivisions to be referred to the boards; instead, the land is subdivided
illegally on the ground.
Another attempt to control land parcellation was made by the
Registered Land Act 1963 which empowers the Minister of Lands and
Settlement to prescribe for any registration section the maximum number
of persons who are allowed to be registered in the same register as proprietors 4 4 and provides that until he does so prescribe, no dealing shall
be registered which, if registered, would have the effect of vesting any
parcel of land in more than five proprietors. 45 Although this provision is
partly designed to facilitate conveyancing, the fact that the Minister may
prescribe different maximum numbers of coproprietors for different areas
clearly indicates that the section was also intended to prevent the unlimited subdivision of land. Moreover, provision is made for the compensation of an heir who is prevented by this section from being registered as
coproprietor of land to which he is entitled under customary law. 46 This
has not proved a very successful device for controlling land parcellation.
In the first place, it is hardly a very satisfactory solution that heirs should
be compensated with other property, especially as the land will constitute
the principal if not the only asset of the estate. Secondly, in cases where
there are more than five heirs it would be possible to register the land in
the names of five of the heirs to hold it on trust for themselves and the
remaining heirs. However, the main reason why S. 101 (4) has proved a
dead letter is that so few successions to land are registered.
It remains to consider the extent to which land registration has
created a situation where the owners of plots that are not economically
viable are prepared to sell them to bigger farmers in a position to develop
them more effectively; after all, this was commonly seen to be the consequence of the establishment of a land market free from customary restraints on alienation. In fact the very opposite seems to be the case, and
as far as it is possible to generalise, it would appear that the smaller the
amount of land which a person owns the more reluctant he becomes to sell
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it. Thus, in areas of acute land shortage the market in land begins to
stagnate. Interestingly enough, traditional residence patterns may be
abandoned and new forms of cooperation adopted in an attempt to make the
most of the available land. It is likely, however, that gradually fields
devoted to cash crops will be turned over to subsistence crops or used for
residential purposes. Agricultural productivity will obviously suffer, but
in most cases the landowner will be most reluctant to leave the land which
provides him with the only security that he has. Nor will he be prepared
to hand over his land to a single heir, at least without making adequate
provision for the others. The customary duty of a man to provide land for
his sons must still be carried out.
It is appropriate to conclude this section with a brief look at the
identity of those who are buying and selling land, with a view to testing the
truth of Swynnerton's prediction that the land reform programme would
create both a landed and a landless class. It has already been noted that
during the colonial period certain farmers (the "better" farmers) were
accumulating relatively large areas of land and that the prospect of land
adjudication often operated to accelerate this process. Such evidence that
exists suggests that it is the same people, the better farmers and those
enjoying off-farm incomes, who are purchasing land today and it is the
poorer farmers who are selling land, with the result that the pattern of
landholding is being radically transformed, even though it may still be
premature, at least in most areas, to talk of the creation of a landed and a
landless class. Thus, in a study of forty-one sales of land in an area of
Western Kenya the present writer found that in thirty-six cases the purchasers had off-farm incomes and that in two other classes they were
wealthy farmers; only in three cases could the purchasers be described as
ordinary farmers. V Of the forty-one vendors only two had off-farm incomes and twenty-nine admitted selling their land in order to meet some
pressing demand for cash.
In three of these twenty-nine instances
the sales had made the vendors landless. Crude as these statistics admittedly are, they do suggest that Swynnerton's prediction was correct and
that insofar as the land reform programme has stimulated the growth of a
land market, it has resulted in increasing disparities of landholding. The
government does not seem to regard this situation with any concern; certainly the provision in the Land Contract Act 1967 to the effect that the
board should generally refuse its consent to a transaction where the purchaser already has sufficient agricultural land is totally disregarded. 48
One consequence of the process described in the previous paragraph
is the growing use of paid labour on farms. It is, predictably, the better
farmers and those landowners with off-farm incomes who tend to hire
labour. Similarly, it is generally the poorer farmers who find themselves
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compelled to seek paid employment away from their farms, and many of
them will take work as labourers on the farms of their richer neighbours.
Such labourers are not, strictly speaking, landless; they have access to
land in the area, but their plots are small enough or their families large
enough to enable them to work elsewhere during the daytime. It is,
therefore, probably too early to talk about the emergence of a class of
landless labourers in the former Trust Lands, though there can be little
doubt that this is likely to occur over the next few decades.
Conclusions
An attempt has been made in the foregoing pages to present a general
picture of the Kenya land reform programme and to assess its achievements in the light of its declared objectives. It represents a highly ambitious experiment in the use of law to engineer social change, since it
assumes that the statutory introduction of a new tenurial regime will automatically trigger off certain responses from which a number of desired
ends (legal, social and economic) will surely flow. However, a study of
the working of the programme not only suggests that this assumption is
not justified, but also throws light on the comlex relationship between
law and development. It is simply not sufficient to conclude that the programme provides yet another example of "soft development 4 9 and to attribute this to the innate conservativism of the people concerned. 50 After
all, we are not dealing with a case of "fantasy law." 51 Far from being a
dead letter, the programme has had a variety of consequences, both
direct and indirect, and it therefore provokes us to try and identify the
factors that enhance or limit the effectiveness of law as a developmental
tool.

First, there is the question of communication, for it is obviously
unrealistic to expect bureaucrats and farmers to change their behaviour
in conformity with the law unless they are made aware of the sort of behaviour that is required. In the absence of any institutionalised channels
for the flow of information the task of communication inevitably lies with
the bureaucracy, as indeed it did during the colonial era, and its success
in carrying out this task will clearly depend on a number of factors including its own understanding of the information, its resources in relation to the size of the task and its susceptibility to countervailing pressures. It has been seen that, in the case of the land reform programme,
communication has often been unsatisfactory. Thus the land adjudication
authorities are not fulfilling all their statutory duties. This may in part
be due to a scarcity of resources and to competing considerations of
speed and convenience, but should principally be attributed to the highly
technical nature of the information to be communicated. It is unlikely
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that senior officials of the Land Adjudication Department fully grasp the
complexities of the adjudication process and it is therefore not surprising
that local adjudication officers, not to mention the committee members,
should have an imperfect idea of the nature of their powers and duties.
Similarly, it would seem that the bureaucracy has not been wholly successful in communicating to landowners the nature of the system of
registration of title and, in particular, the need for them to register dispositions of and successions to registered land. Here again the reason
lies partly in the scarcity of resources but mainly in the abstruse nature
of the information to be communicated.
Even assuming that the necessary information has been effectively
communicated to those whose behaviour it is desired to change, it is
unlikely that they will conform unless they perceive it to be in their
interest to do so, and the greater the changes in behaviour required, the
greater the need for measures to induce conformity. Such measures fall
broadly into two categories, those that rely on sanctions and those that
rely on rewards. The use of sanctions to secure developmental ends has
not had a very encouraging record. It is not simply that their use tends
to increase bureaucratic power and to undermine the government's legitimacy, but they do not even work very effectively, especially where, as
in the case of the land reform programme, considerable changes of behaviour are required on the part of a substantial number of people. The
criminal law, in particular, is a singularly blunt instrument and it is not
surprising that, as we have seen, the authorities have not resorted to its
use to secure conformity with the programme. Enforcement machinery
on a scale unthinkable in present circumstances would be required to
ensure that landowners register dispositions and successions, that they
submit their dealings to the land control board and abide by its decision,
that semi-nomadic Masai herdsmen respect the newly-established ranch
boundaries and so on.
The rewards strategy is certainly a more appropriate way of
attaining developmental goals. Thus, if agricultural credit was more
widely available, landowners would have greater incentive to keep their
land registers up to date. If membership of a group ranch was seen to
confer distinct benefits, the Masai herdsmen might choose to respect
ranch boundaries and obey ranch bylaws. The problem is that the "rewards" are frequently limited to quantity and also that they are seldom
universally appreciated, with the result that their distribution depends
on self-selection by a relatively small number of individuals. The
present study has provided several examples of this process. It has
been argued that there exists a recognisable group of landowners, 53 the
better farmers -- often men with off-farm incomes, who have clearly
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benefited from the programme. It was they who were accumulating land
before, and often in anticipation of, land adjudication. It was they who
were able to manipulate the adjudication process to their advantage. It is
they who today are extending their holdings by purchase now that the disappearance of customary restraint on alienation has led to the emergence
of an open market in land. It is they who enjoy privileged access to credit
and extension services. Here again the role of the bureaucracy is important and it is not surprising that even where they have not consciously
adopted a policy of "betting on the strong," they are likely to favour those
farmers who share their goals and who could influence their careers.
Moreover, the legitimacy of the government is undermined to the extent
that the bureaucracy is hierarchical, undemocratic and lacking in adequate feedback channels of communication.
There are those who find neither strategy attractive and who maintain
that, as widespread non-conformity with a law brings the whole law into
disrespect, a government should do nothing until near-total conformity is
assured. Thus it might be argued that the introduction of a system of
registration of title should have been delayed until farmers and bureaucrats understood its implications and appreciated its advantages. However, reliance in the meantime on the evolution of customary land law
through the medium of the courts is hardly a feasible option for an Afri can government. Governments are in a hurry and the imperatives of
development preclude the possibility of inaction. The choice of policy
lies between two poles, between socialism and capitalism, between reliance on Plan and reliance of market incentives, between the use of sanctions and the use of rewards. The policy of the Kenyan government tends
to be situated near the latter pole and this is clearly demonstrated by the
land reform programme. 54 Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that
the individualisation of land tenure and the differential provision of credit
were the devices used to mould the structure of the peasant farming economy and to bring it within the wider framework of periphery capitalism.
On this analysis the increasing stratification on socio-economic lines to
be found in rural Kenya is an inevitable consequence of the government's
decision to accept the general structure of the colonial economy. From
this perspective the programme not only illustrates the limits of law as
an agent of social change, but also demonstrates the way in which the law
may be used to promote the development of class interests.
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